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Abstract
In the absence of a ready-made solution that could be adopted by the people of Northern
Ireland, or a magical formula from the British and Irish Governments, the only alternative lay
in locally-mandated political parties negotiating a political agreement. This alternative in turn
entailed a common recognition that the zero-sum politics of “winner takes all” ultimately leaves
everyone a loser. An accommodation, while requiring each party to sacrifice some of its aspira-
tions, stood to benefit Northern Ireland society as a whole.
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INTRODUCTION
The Belfast Agreement' marks an historic accommodation
among the varied political traditions of Northern Ireland. Many
of the proposals put forward by the Alliance Party are reflected
in that deal. We accept the Agreement in full, but recognize
that while it has many strengths, it also contains several weak-
nesses. There are both short- and long-term threats to its dura-
bility. Furthermore, it will not by itself bring about the creation
of a liberal, pluralist, non-sectarian society. The Agreement is in
practice a form of conflict management-a "Band-Aid" solution
to the problem of Northern Ireland. However, many of the
measures required to consolidate the Agreement are also funda-
mental to the healing of divisions and the eradication of sectari-
anism.
Historically, the Alliance Party has approached the North-
ern Ireland conflict from the perspective that any proposed sys-
tem of governance had to achieve broad-based legitimacy across
a divided society. Any set of political and security proposals that
failed to acknowledge and to address the nature of society here
would be bound to fail.
Therefore, in the absence of a ready-made solution that
could be adopted by the people of Northern Ireland, or a magi-
cal formula from the British and Irish Governments, the only
* The authors would like to thank David Alderdice, Lori Cannon, David Ford,
Richard Good, Allan Leonard, Jillian Leopold, Lisa Leopold, Philip McGarry, Ciaran
Toland, Brian Wilson, and Nicholas Whyte for commenting upon earlier drafts and
giving further suggestions.
** Stephen Farry acted as a researcher and negotiator for the Alliance Talks Team.
He is completing a doctorate in International Relations.
*** Sean Neeson is the Leader of the Alliance Party. He served as a senior negoti-
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1. Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998 [hereinafter
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alternative lay in locally-mandated political parties negotiating a
political agreement. This alternative in turn entailed a common
recognition that the zero-sum politics of "winner takes all" ulti-
mately leaves everyone a loser. An accommodation, while re-
quiring each party to sacrifice some of its aspirations, stood to
benefit Northern Ireland society as a whole.
I. THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT'
The Northern Ireland conflict is primarily ethno-nationalist
in nature and is focused around a clash of political identities -
Unionism and Nationalism. It is not fundamentally about reli-
gion, but the terms "Protestant" and "Catholic" all too often
serve as convenient labels for Unionists and Nationalists.
This conflict is manifested through the difficulty of identify-
ing political institutions that can carry widespread political legiti-
macy. Different national and constitutional aspirations are pur-
sued by those associated with the above identities, and there is
an absence of any substantial agreed-upon common identity
among the people of Northern Ireland. Unionists and Nation-
alists primarily identify with the concepts of Britishness and Ir-
ishness respectively rather than any concept of Northern Irish-
ness.
3
The use of violence to achieve political ends was the most
apparent aspect of the conflict within Northern Ireland. The
litany of terrorist atrocities collectively constituting the "Trou-
bles" have in some way affected almost every citizen of our soci-
ety as well as those further afield. The use of political violence,
however, was only a symptom of a much wider problem-a
deeply divided society.
At its core, the conflict is essentially one in which Unionists
and Nationalists seek to maximize the power and benefits for
those associated with them. This is expressed through contests
for the control of territory, demands for Unionist and National-
ist "group rights," and attempts to maximize the level of re-
sources that are perceived to be going to each segment of soci-
2. See JOHN WHYTE, INTERPRETING NORTHERN IRELAND (1990) for a comprehensive,
survey of the different schools of thought on the nature of conflict in Ireland.
3. Colin Irwin, In Search of a Settlement: Summary Tables of Principal Statistical
Results 11-12 (Jan. 14, 1998) (unpublished opinion poll, on file with the Fordham Inter-
national Law Journal).
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ety. Substantial segregation is the norm in Northern Ireland.
There are many segregated housing estates, frequently marked
out by the symbolism of the dominant group. Despite public
demand for integrated education, ninety-seven percent of chil-
dren attend schools that are almost exclusively Protestant (State)
or Catholic schools. The people of Northern Ireland have few
symbols that they share in common.
With the Republican and Loyalist cease-fires in place, the
sectarian nature of Northern Ireland society has come into
clearer focus. No issue better illustrates this point than the con-
troversy surrounding Orange parades. The Protestant marching
orders have claimed an absolute "right to march," even through
areas that are predominately populated by Nationalists, who, in
turn, have claimed an absolute "right" to determine which
groups parade the neighborhoods. These competing claims of
rights have been exercised without consideration for the wider
impact on society as a whole. Terrorism was only ever practiced
by small groups on the political extremes; however, the march-
ing issue has demonstrated that there is an ambiguous attitude
towards the rule of law on behalf of a wider section of the Union-
ist and Nationalist populations. Major confrontations have now
occurred at Drumcree for four summers running. The events in
1996 brought Northern Ireland to the brink of civil war; the con-
frontation that occurred in 1998 happened despite the conclu-
sion of the Agreement. The awful bombing at Omagh in August
1998 demonstrated that even with cease-fires from the main-
stream paramilitary organizations in place, smaller groups on
both the Republican and Loyalist fringe retain the potential to
inflict death and destruction on a mammoth scale.
Northern Ireland, in general, cannot be described as a plu-
ralist society. The Unionist-Nationalist cleavage dominates soci-
ety. The other significant cleavage-religion-also has a very
high correlation with this political one. Potential cross-cutting
cleavages in Northern Ireland, such as class, ideology, gender, or
simple differences of opinion on socio-economic issues, are of
limited significance. Elections are sadly little more than tribal
head-counts. There are few floating voters who are prepared to
vote across the communal divide. The main interest for many
observers is rather the distribution of support between more
moderate and extreme factions within the Unionist and Nation-
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alist blocs. Furthermore, politics in Northern Ireland have be-
come even more polarized over the course of the "Troubles."
While this basic analysis may appear to be very depressing,
some comfort can be taken in that it is, in fact, overly simplistic.
There are substantial numbers of individuals who do not associ-
ate with either Protestantism or Catholicism, either because they
belong to other denominations, follow no faith, or refuse to say.
In the 1991 Census, such people amounted to eleven percent of
the population. Politically, there are a substantial number of
people who do not vote for either Unionist or Nationalist par-
ties. In the 1998 Assembly elections, this share was almost nine
percent of the population.4
In a January 1998 opinion poll, thirty-three percent of the
respondents expressed a strong or moderate identification with
the concept of a political "center ground," while forty percent
and twenty-nine percent voiced similar affiliation with Unionism
and Nationalism, respectively.5 Although some of the former
still voted for parties that are overtly Unionist or Nationalist, this
is nevertheless an encouraging sign. While this center ground is
substantially more pluralist than the population as a whole, it is
diffuse and relatively less clear in its identity than Unionism and
Nationalism. Yet it can quantify to what extent, if any, the
wounds of a divided society have healed in the wake of the
Agreement.
The Alliance Party is the strongest political manifestation of
the political "center." The party does not define itself in terms
of either Unionism and Nationalism. Instead, it is defined by its
support for a shared, integrated Northern Ireland society with a
political culture based on liberal and democratic norms. Alli-
ance is fundamentally a liberal, pluralist, non-ethnic party,
rather than a collection of soft Unionists and soft Nationalists co-
habitating together in an uneasy coalition. Currently, only Alli-
ance supporters more strongly associate with a concept of
Northern Irishness ahead of Britishness or Irishness.6
In addition, there is substantial diversity both within Union-
ism and Nationalism, and within Protestantism and Catholicism.
4. See Paul Wilder, A Pluralist Parliament for a Pluralist People? The New Northern Ire-
land Assembly Elections, 25June 1998, 35 Representation No. 2/3, at 102 (1998).
5. Irwin, supra note 3, at 11-12.
6. Id. at 12.
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It is particularly insulting to suggest to many Protestants that
they have more in common with Ian Paisley than with any
Catholics, and to suggest to many Catholics that they have more
in common with Gerry Adams than any Protestants.
Finally, there is substantial evidence from a succession of
opinion polls that people overwhelmingly support the concept
of shared institutions within Northern Ireland rather than sepa-
rate bodies for separate communities. In particular, there is con-
siderable support for integrated education.7
For all these reasons, it is wrong to simply describe North-
ern Ireland as a problem of "two communities." Unfortunately,
through institutionalizing tribal politics, that is just how the
Agreement treats Northern Ireland. This flaw in the Belfast
Agreement has implications for attempts to build a more liberal
pluralist society upon the foundation of the Agreement.
II. SOLUTIONS
Terrorism and the use of the political violence were only
ever symptoms of a much deeper disease-a deeply divided soci-
ety. A political problem requires a political solution. Therefore,
security measures alone could not have constituted a successful
response.
Purported solutions that fail to take account of the deeply
divided nature of Northern Ireland's society could be easily dis-
missed. The constitutional integration into the United King-
dom, i.e., no longer treating Northern Ireland as a special case,
would fail to address the needs of Nationalists. The creation of a
United Ireland would not take into account the needs of Union-
ists. Similarly, a repeat of the majoritarian devolution of the
Stormont regime between 1921 and 1972 was never seriously on
the table. Although paying lip-service to liberal, democratic
norms, this system was in practice an "ethnic democracy." A suf-
ficiently large minority of the population saw the political system
as illegitimate. The majority that viewed the state as legitimate
was virtually the same majority that sustained the Ulster Unionist
Party in single party rule for over fifty years. As long as politics is
dominated by ethno-nationalism, majority rule will lead to one
section of the population having exclusive access to power at the
7. Tom Hadden et al., Separation or Sharing?: The People's Choice, FORTNIGHT 356,
Dec. 1996, at Supp. 8-9.
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expense of others, while the rotation of power between govern-
ment and opposition necessary to sustain an effective democracy
will be absent.
The repartition of Northern Ireland-into Protestant and
Catholic areas-is a suggestion that does at least acknowledge a
divided society. It is, however, an affront to universal liberal
democratic norms. The idea of ethnically homogenous states is
largely treated with disdain, notwithstanding their unfortunate
creation in the Balkans. In any event, repartition would not be
possible without substantial movements of population and prob-
able violent ethnic cleansing. In the Talks, repartition was never
an option. However, in the event of the collapse of the Agree-
ment, it remains an ominous possibility. The other possible re-
sponse would be a joint authority over Northern Ireland by the
British and Irish Governments, leaving little scope for local deci-
sion-making.
Alliance ideally would prefer the creation of a genuine lib-
eral democracy. Liberal democracy treats the individual as the
cornerstone of society. Ethnic affiliations are formally ignored
by the state. All individuals are accorded equal civil and political
rights and are judged by merit. They are free to mix, integrate,
assimilate, or, alternatively, form separate communities-pro-
vided they do not discriminate against others. "Liberal democ-
racy fosters civility, namely, a common domain of values, institu-
tions and identity, at the expense of communalism."'
Pure liberal democracy is, of course, an ideal model. In
practice, most countries can only approximate it, as. the ethos
and institution of the state tends to reflect the values and sym-
bolism of a dominant group or influence. When a state falls well
short of the model, it is better described as an "ethnic democ-
racy." To qualify as a liberal democracy, Northern Ireland would
require the fusion of a new shared civic culture. It is not realistic
or acceptable to expect one tradition to assimilate its culture
into the other. Under this common umbrella, a diversity of sub-
cultures should be maintained and cherished. Liberal democ-
racy in a divided society cannot rest on the ethos of either
Unionism or Nationalism hegemony.
The creation of a shared civic culture is much more feasible
8. Sammy Smooha & Theodor Hanf, The Diverse Modes of Conflict-Regulation in
Deeply Divided Societies, 33 Irr'LJ. COMP. Soc. 26, 33 (1992).
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within immigrant societies. In the United States, Canada, and
Australia, the process occurred at the expense of indigenous
peoples; there were also frequently other groups excluded. Afri-
can-Americans remained outside the "melting-pot" in the United
States until the Civil Rights Movement, and in Canada, French
and English speaking peoples did not fuse together. Neverthe-
less, despite the enormity of the challenge in an existing society
such as Northern Ireland, the goal of liberal democracy should
not be lost.
Within a divided society, a drawback of liberal democracy
can be an actual or perceived failure to deliver equality and non-
discrimination or to address adequately the demands from dif-
ferent groups for autonomy and the institutionalization of col-
lective rights. While Alliance retains a vision of a liberal demo-
cratic society, we recognize that it may not be realistic to move
directly to this from our divided society. Therefore, it is appro-
priate to look towards transitionary models of democracy.
One such form is consociational democracy. Many com-
mentators have described the Agreement as essentially a form of
consociational democracy. Consociational democracy is a model
developed by Arend Lijphart, to explain how democracy was
able to function inside plural or divided societies, i.e., those with
a fragmented political culture.9 While not the antithesis of lib-
eral democracy, this departs from it in several significant re-
spects. ,
The main argument used to justify consociational democ-
racy is that there is no other means of creating a functioning
democracy within a divided society. It provides the lowest com-
mon denominator of acceptability. Consociational democracy
recognizes, implicitly or explicitly, the religious, linguistic, class,
ideological, or ethno-nationalist divisions within a deeply divided
society. It can be characterized by one or more of the following
techniques:
1. a grand coalition approach to executive and/or legisla-
tive decision-making (either formed voluntarily or insti-
tutionalized);
9. AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION
(1977); see ASBJORN EIDE, A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACHES TO
GROUP ACCOMMODATION AND MINORITY PROTECTION IN DIVIDED OR MULTICULTURAL SO-
CIETIES (1996).
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2. a mutual veto (vetoes can be specifically assigned to com-
munal groups, or weighted majorities used to ensure
that one or more grouping cannot dominate out-
comes);
3. proportionality (to ensure that all sections of society are
fairly represented); and
4. segmental autonomy (giving control over certain areas of
policy to communal groups, such as the control of the
Catholic Church over education).
Consociational democracy is a form of power-sharing. How-
ever, the application of power-sharing to deeply divided societies
does not necessarily have to be consociational. 10 For example,
Timothy D. Sisk has set out two broad approaches to power-shar-
ing in divided societies: the consociational and the integrative.
Power-sharing itself is defined as the practices and institutions
that result in broad-based governance generally inclusive of the
major ethnic groups in society. The consociational approach re-
flects the main elements suggested by Lijphart and others; it is
essentially geared towards preserving ethnic group autonomy
while promoting elite accommodation. The integrative model
focuses on inter-group cooperation, establishing majoritarian
but ethnically neutral decision-making and devising ethnically-
blind public policies. These models are intended to not be stark
alternatives but offer a menu of measures to be applied depend-
ing upon the nature of the conflict and divisions within a soci-
ety.'1
Alliance, philosophically, was more in tune with this integra-
tive form of power-sharing or what could be perceived as a
milder form of consociationalism. This approach envisaged the
creation of flexible power-sharing mechanisms which recognize
the existence of a divided society but are linked to strategies to
promote inter-communal reconciliation, greater pluralism, and
the creation and maintenance of shared institutions. Further-
more, any power-sharing mechanisms should be capable of be-
10. It should also be noted that power-sharing is not something that is restricted to
divided societies. It can arise through simple majority coalitions or super-coalitions
within liberal democracies. Frequently, the use of super-majorities to pass important
decisions, such as constitutional amendments, act as vital checks and balances.
11. TIMOTHY D. SISK, POWER-SHARING AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION IN ETHNIC
CONFLICTS (1996); see Paul Dixon, Consociationalism and the Northern Ireland Peace Process:
The Glass Half Full or Half Empty?, 3 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POL. 23 (1997).
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ing superceded after they are no longer needed. This contrasts
with more rigid forms of consociationalism openly based, or
even dependent, upon the continued maintenance of commu-
nal divisions. Measures to promote cross-community contact, in-
tegration, and multi-ethnicity can be sometimes opposed by the
separatists.
III. THE ALLIANCE TALKS AGENDA
While the Alliance Party retained its long-term goal of the
creation of a non-sectarian liberal democratic Northern Ireland,
we sought an Agreement with at least four broad elements:
1. the creation of a power-sharing regional government;
2. the establishment of accountable North-South struc-
tures;
3. the entrenchment of the Principle of Consent; and
4. the establishment of sufficient protections of human
rights.
While our primary role was to represent the interests of our
political constituency, we were further conscious that through
our center role we could play a useful role in bringing Unionists
and Nationalists together. Alliance proposals reflected not only
our own desires, but also what we felt could garner widespread
support across the community.
There are two reasons for our advocacy of a regional Assem-
bly and Government for Northern Ireland, operating on a
power-sharing basis. First, Northern Ireland now constitutes a
natural unit of government. It is increasingly the international
conventional wisdom that while certain decisions remain best
taken at the national level, some are better taken at an interna-
tional level with others at a regional level. Regional government
is now the norm throughout Europe. Indeed, there is a growing
emphasis on a "Europe of the Regions."
Second, devolution can provide a framework for addressing
the divided society of Northern Ireland. A genuine settlement
to the political problem was only possible if all sections of the
community had a perception that they shared in government.
We had recognized that this was not possible under a
majoritarian system. Alliance, in contrast, had been most closely
associated with the advocacy of power-sharing since the early
1970s. In the long-term, a shared regional government would
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aid efforts to generate a greater common identity and sense of
shared destiny among the people of Northern Ireland.
The specific Alliance proposals were based on our policy pa-
per, Governing with Consent.12 This paper proposed that an exec-
utive be formed by voluntary coalition, which, inter alia, had to
be acceptable to at least seventy percent of the members of an
Assembly, and hence cross-community. Similarly, votes on con-
tentious issues would have to meet a weighted majority of seventy
percent. 3 This system carried the advantages of not en-
trenching communal differences and being sufficiently flexible
to cope with changes in society. It was more compatible with
bottom-up reconciliation strategies.
There are undoubtedly political purposes to the advocacy of
North-South structures. They would serve to give some institu-
tional expression to Irish Nationalism to balance any comfort
Unionists obtained from Northern Ireland remaining as a dejure
part of the United Kingdom. However, there are also powerful
social and economic reasons to justify North-South bodies.
Their creation would go a long way to overcoming the socio-eco-
nomic dislocations caused by the partition of Ireland. The
Framework Document had already cited four advantages that
such structures could provide in various areas of social and eco-
nomic policy:
1. the common interest in a given matter on the part of
both parts of the island;
2. the mutual advantage of addressing a matter together;
3. the mutual benefit that may derive from matters being
administered by the North/South body; and
4. the achievement of economics of scale and the avoid-
ance of unnecessary duplication of effort.' 4
Issues that remained to be resolved included the identifica-
tion of issues for cooperation, the nature of cooperation in each
area, the powers and remit of any free-standing bodies, and the
lines of accountability and decision-making authority. Alliance
was clear that all North-South cooperation ultimately should be
12. THE ALLIANCE PARTY or NORTHERN IRELAND, GOVERNING WITH CONSENT (1988)
(on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
13. This threshold could have been lowered without much risk in any potential
agreement in 1998 as Nationalism is numerically stronger now than it was in 1988.
14. A New Framework for Agreement, Dec. 1994, para. 25, 34 I.L.M. 946 (1995).
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accountable to the Assembly and the Oireachtas. We were also
conscious that Northern Ireland as a region in a sovereign state
would suffer from asymmetries in cooperating with a fully sover-
eign state in terms of the powers and resources available to each.
Therefore, it was imperative that the devolution of powers to
Northern Ireland was as maximalist as possible. This would in-
clude the power to vary tax.
The Principle of Consent recognizes that it is the right of
the people of Northern Ireland to determine their own future,
i.e., to decide whether it remains part of the United Kingdom or
joins a united Ireland. Northern Ireland suffers from historical
counter-claims to self-determination. Nationalists argue that in-
dependence should have been given to the island of Ireland as a
whole, while Unionists believe that their concentration in the
north-east of the island entitled them to separate consideration.
Irrespective of the rights or wrongs of what occurred during
the 1920s, international law is today quite clear that self-determi-
nation should only occur within currently existing borders, ex-
cept where otherwise agreed by sovereign states. Additionally, it
is supposed to be a right only for colonial territories to gain their
independence.
The immediate problem for Northern Ireland was to arrive
at a formula for self-determination to which both Unionists and
Nationalists could agree. Considerable clarity had been given to
the concept through unilateral statements made by the British
Government in legislation and other documents. With the his-
toric Downing Street Declaration, the British and Irish Govern-
ments reached a common understanding on this issue. In the
Forum for Peace and Reconciliation (in which Alliance was the
only non-Nationalist party to take part), all the participating par-
ties, bar Sinn Fin, found agreement on this issue. It remained
for the Northern Ireland political parties to give their agreement
to this formulation formally through a Multi-Party Talks Agree-
ment, and for the Republic of Ireland to amend Articles 2 and 3
of its Constitution to reflect these new understandings.
While Alliance recognizes the need for an agreed-upon
formula for self-determination, it remains something that could
hurt Northern Ireland if put into practice. Any border poll
would provide a stark choice that would polarize the community
and create perceptions of winners and losers; it would be pro-
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foundly unhelpful to efforts made in trying to heal the divisions
within Northern Ireland.
However, there are other elements of self-determination
that are becoming increasingly recognized. If the maintenance
of borders is judged to be necessary by the international commu-
nity to maintain stability, then states, in return, are expected to
ensure the highest standards of human rights and protections
for minorities. It is also important that the institutions of gov-
ernance carry broad-based popular legitimacy. Therefore, it was
vital that any agreement produced by the Talks be ratified by the
population of Northern Ireland. 5
Alliance wished to see measures put in place to better guar-
antee human rights and to ensure equality within Northern Ire-
land. The British Constitution protected individual rights on
the basis of a defacto "gentleman's agreement." It was assumed
by successive Governments that any formal measures would clash
with the peculiarly British concept of Parliamentary Sovereignty.
Although the United Kingdom was a signatory to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms16 ("ECHR"), this was not incorporated into domes-
tic law.
In Northern Ireland, there had been a long history of civil
rights abuses under the Stormont regime. Considerable im-
provements in the protection of human rights did occur under
direct rule. Nevertheless, given our history, it was imperative
that formal protections were introduced into our domestic law.
Alliance therefore welcomed the belated decision of the Labor
Administration to incorporate the ECHR. It would be important
that decisions of any Northern Ireland Government and Assem-
bly could be struck down if they were .regarded as unconstitu-
tional. Alliance is further prepared to consider other interna-
tional conventions that could be incorporated into a Northern
Ireland Bill of Rights to give added protections. 17
The issue of equality is linked to the human rights agenda.
Equality entails ensuring equality of opportunity, equality of
15. See Hurst Hannum, The Specter of Secession: Responding to Claims for Ethnic Self-
Determination, 77 FOREIGN AFF. No. 2 (1998); EIDE, supra note 9, ch. 3.
16. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
17. See KEVIN BOYLE ET AL., THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF
PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN IRELAND (1996).
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treatment, and equal protection under the law for every citizen.
It requires steps to give every person in Northern Ireland a
greater sense of being a full citizen. The equality agenda there-
fore entails measures to overcome the continuing legacies of
long-past discrimination, for example, tackling the higher unem-
ployment rate among Catholics compared to Protestants and
making the symbolism and ethos of Northern Ireland more neu-
tral. It is important to bear in mind, however, that equality in
Northern Ireland is an issue that not only affects Protestants and
Catholics, but also extends to gender, ethnicity, sexual orienta-
tion, and disability. Furthermore, there should be no hierarchy
that treats one form of discrimination as more important than
another.
Finally, Alliance was keen to ensure that the terms of any
agreement were worked out between the parties according to
the principles of democracy, negotiation and compromise, and
the rule of law. The participants in the Multi-Party Talks
("Talks") included political parties with little or no association
with paramilitary groups, and parties with implicit but neverthe-
less clear links to paramilitaries. The main-i.e., electorally
strongest-parties were not those with the ability to influence
the outcome of the Talks through either the threat of violence
or the actual use of violence. Northern Ireland was not a situa-
tion that could be resolved according to the balance of forces at
the cessation of hostilities.
After the Republican and Loyalist cease-fires, the decommis-
sioning, i.e., the retirement from use, of paramilitary weapons
was raised by Unionists as a major barrier to the start of all-inclu-
sive negotiations. While decommissioning could create a short
term barrier to renewed terrorism (and prevent weapons falling
into the hands of ordinary criminals), there was nothing to pre-
vent the acquisition of further arms if the paramilitaries so
wished. To Alliance, decommissioning would serve essentially as
one of many possible confidence-building measures, i.e., steps to
give the people of Northern Ireland a greater sense that the
threat of terrorist violence had diminished. Decommissioning,
therefore, was never a formal precondition to Alliance opening
up a dialogue with those parties with paramilitary links after
cease-fires were in place; our only condition was the end of the
political violence.
However, Alliance was concerned with ensuring that the
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Talks did operate within the necessary peaceful and democratic
framework. The Report of the International Body on Decom-
missioning from January 1996 navigated around the decommis-
sioning barrier to Talks. The Mitchell Principles set out the
guidelines for conduct during the Talks to which the parties
were expected to give their allegiance. In addition, the elections
to the Talks served not only to demonstrate which parties had
the electoral strength to justify a place at the Table, but also to
remind the participants that they would be negotiating on the
basis of an exclusively democratic mandate. The notion that the
paramilitary parties should be ignored or that no compromises
should be made with them was fanciful.
During the process of the Talks, Alliance found it necessary
to take out indictments against parties for breaches of the Mitch-
ell Principles on three occasions: against the Ulster Unionists
and the Democratic Unionist Party for threatening the integrity
of the rule of law at Drumcree in 1996; against the Ulster Demo-
cratic Party for breaches of the UDA cease-fire in January 1998;
and against Sinn Ffin for breaches of the IRA cease-fire in Feb-
ruary 1998. The indictments on the latter two occasions resulted
in temporary exclusions from the process for the parties con-
cerned.
IV. THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT: AN ASSESSMENT
The Belfast Agreement stands out as an enormous achieve-
ment. The successful conclusion of the Talks process con-
founded the doubts of numerous skeptics. It stands as a tribute
to all the parties concerned, the three Co-Chairmen (Senator
George Mitchell, General John de Chastelain, and Prime Minis-
ter Harri Holkeri), the British Prime Ministers (Tony Blair and
John Major), and the Irish Taoisigh (Bertie Ahern and John
Bruton).
The record of talks processes throughout the world, both
contemporary and historical, in terms of the parties concerned
freely negotiating new arrangements, is poor. In reality most
conflicts have been dampened by one or more parties to the dis-
pute becoming dominant and subjugating their opponents, or
by the underlying issues behind the conflict changing to such an
extent that the conflict naturally dies out.
The Belfast Agreement stands out as more of a classic com-
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promise. Alliance had helped to introduce the concept of "suffi-
cient consensus," which was borrowed from the South African
experience, to ensure that decisions in the Talks had majority
support on both sides of the community. We saw it as a tempo-
rary voting arrangement necessary to reach agreement.
The Talks Agreement is primarily a political deal. It sets out
political institutions that carry broad-based legitimacy. It is not
strictly a "peace" agreement in the sense of a deal which delivers
negotiated cease-fires from the paramilitaries. However, an im-
portant aspect of the Talks process was the consolidation of the
cease-fires that already existed. This "peace process" became sy-
nonymous with the "political process" over the course of the
Talks.
By definition, every party had to sacrifice some of their aspi-
rations in order to benefit from the potential peace and stability
provided by an agreed form of governance. Compromise, how-
ever, means that each of the participants supporting the Agree-
ment has to accept it as a whole. They cannot "cherry-pick" over
its terms. The Alliance Party accepts the Agreement in full. It
reflects many of the principles and concepts advocated by us.
We recognize, however, that it contains various weaknesses as
well as strengths.
A. Constitutional Issues
The highlight of this section on Constitutional Issues is the
now near universal acceptance of the Principle of Consent (nota-
bly now including Sinn F~in). While not resolving the counter-
claims of Unionists and Nationalists over Northern Ireland's
constitutional status, this section does at least demonstrate the
existence of a consensus that Northern Ireland will be the unit
for self-determination and provides agreed rules for testing con-
sent. Furthermore, the right of self-determination is correctly
framed in civic terms. The changes in the Irish Constitution,
through the amendment of Articles 2 and 3, mark a more liberal
separation of the Irish "nation" from the Irish state.18
B. Strand One
Positively, Strand One creates a power-sharing Executive
18. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, Constitutional Issues, Annex B.
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and Assembly for Northern Ireland. The level of devolution is
more extensive than that currently being offered to Wales, but is
regrettably less than that which is due to be delivered to Scot-
land. The most notable absence is the power to vary tax. In ad-
dition, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland retains con-
trol over a number of functions, most notably security. It is reas-
suring that we are to run a government through an Executive
composed of Ministers, rather than attempting to do this
through committees as was suggested by some participants.19
The principle of power-sharing has been accepted, and a com-
prehensive system of checks and balances created to ensure that
decisions enjoy cross-community support.20 Although Alliance
would disagree with some of the details, we nevertheless warmly
welcome these developments. Importantly, any legislation that
does not conform to the human rights provision can be declared
void by the courts.2 1
The Civic Forum is also an important initiative within
Strand One.22 Northern Ireland has an advantage over other di-
vided societies such as Belgium in that, despite the polarizing
effects of the "Troubles," it retains an active cross-community
civic society. A civic society that can represent business, trade
union, and voluntary/community sectors without being po-
larized into Unionist and Nationalist wings would provide a pow-
erful demonstration of pluralism within Northern Ireland. The
Agreement grants a Civic Forum a consultative role in relation to
the Assembly. It should be able to complement the work of the
latter by taking a look at cross-sectoral themes and trying to chal-
lenge conventional wisdom.
Some elements within Strand One cause particular concern.
The designation of representatives as "Unionist," "Nationalist,"
or "Other" is problematic.2 3 It can be deemed offensive to make
people adopt such labels (although a similar practice also takes
place in the Belgian Parliament). It marks a further corporatiz-
19. Id., Strand One, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland, Executive Au-
thority 1 14-25.
20. Id., Strand One, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland, Safeguards 5.
21. Id., Strand One, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland, Legislation
26(a).
22. Id. 34.
23. Id., Strand One, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland, Operation of
the Assembly 6.
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ing of society and the institutionalizing of divisions through
granting group identities considerable weight at the expense of
the individual. This will present greater obstacles to the project
of creating a truly integrated non-sectarian society. The space
for those who do not align with either of the main groups is
treated negatively, as indicated by the use of the term "Other" in
the Agreement. Alliance has in practice been able to use the
designation of "Centre."
The use of designations creates some particular problems
within the voting system. The use of thresholds linked to desig-
nations in both the parallel consent and weighted majority ver-
sions of cross-community voting can become a hostage to for-
tune if one group has difficulty in delivering sufficient votes.24
The Assembly risks paralysis from anti-Agreement forces. Both
Unionists and Nationalists are granted greater political rights
than "Others." This institutionalization of sectarianism works
against center parties; there are disincentives for voters to sup-
port them as they will at times have less influence in the Assem-
bly. This could create barriers to the growth of the important
center-ground in Northern Irish politics. These deficiencies
could have been minimized through the use of a non-qualified
weighted majority for contentious votes.
Rather than allowing the Executive to be created voluntarily
by parties who together (or singularly) can achieve the support
of the (weighted) majority of Assembly representatives, the Exec-
utive is to be formed (or imposed) institutionally according to a
set formula. 25 This does facilitate all-inclusive government, sub-
ject to parties having sufficient democratic support to qualify to
participate, but it can create unwilling partners in government
and pose major problems for coordinating action between De-
partments, and the creation of a budget and a coherent program
of action. A Northern Ireland Government could quickly be-
come fragmented.
There are some further deficiencies in the Agreement that
will limit Northern Ireland's ability to perform as a regional gov-
ernment. There is an asymmetrical balance between Northern
24. Id., Strand One, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland, Safeguards
5(d).
25. Id., Strand One, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland, Executive Au-
thority 16.
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Ireland as a regional government cooperating-or competing,
depending on the context-with the Republic of Ireland as a
state with sovereign power (albeit limited inter alia by member-
ship of the European Union). The absence of tax-varying pow-
ers for Northern Ireland further exacerbates this imbalance.
C. Strands Two and Three
The North-South and East-West structures set out in Strands
Two and Three provide an open and flexible approach to bor-
ders. Northern Ireland, as a region, is set to develop institution-
ally its links with the Republic of Ireland and the other parts of
the United Kingdom.
The North-South Ministerial Council is the more significant
creation. Enhanced opportunities to develop substantive cross-
border relationships now exist. Alliance is satisfied that the deci-
sion-making processes in the Council, and the actions of the Im-
plementation Bodies are fully accountable to the Northern Ire-
land Assembly and the Oireachtas. The British-Irish Council is a
more embryonic idea. It recognizes the increasingly regional
character of the British Isles and the need for horizontal net-
work among its many parts.
D. Human Rights, Safeguards, and Equality of Opportunity
The Agreement recognizes that some existing measures are
already being implemented or planned by the British Govern-
ment, namely the incorporation of the ECHR, the ratification of
the European Framework Convention on the Protection of Na-
tional Minorities, 6 and new "equality" legislation. Disappoint-
ingly, the Irish Government made only loose commitments to
consider further formal protections for human rights.2 7
The Agreement creates a Northern Ireland Human Rights
Commission. One of its tasks will be advising the British Govern-
ment as to which supplementary rights should be defined to
form part of a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights in conjunction
26. Council of Europe, Framework Convention for the Protection of National Mi-
norities, 34 I.L.M. 351 (1995) [hereinafter Framework Convention].
27. See Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Oppor-
tunity, Human Rights, Comparable Steps by the Irish Government 9.
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with the ECHR.28
There are both opportunities and threats within this task.
There is a real danger that attempts to institutionalize Unionist
and Nationalist "group rights" (beyond those political "rights"
already in place through the Agreement) could result in the fur-
ther entrenchment of sectarian divisions. Group rights, so ex-
pressed, risk undermining both the primacy and universality of
individual rights. Many minority groups, however, do not be-
lieve that frameworks for the protection of individual rights are
totally sufficient for their needs. Some states have now defined
group rights in their constitutions. One notable example is Can-
ada with respect to both its French speaking and indigenous
populations. International and regional organizations have also
recognized this demand through the drafting of several conven-
tions. These are available for states either to ratify or to incorpo-
rate into their domestic law.
If some further human rights protections for (minority)
groups are deemed necessary, then it is better to implement
them by observing international standards as the Agreement sug-
gests. This approach not only provides readily available options,
but also, as international conventions do not seek to define "mi-
norities," can avoid problems of delineation of minorities.
Through references to "persons belonging to national minori-
ties" a fundamental reference back to individual rights is pre-
served.29
E. Decommissioning
Decommissioning did not occur in parallel to the Talks as
the Mitchell Report envisaged. However, it was not an issue that
could be dismissed. A two-year time limit for the completion of
this process was inserted. 0 With an Agreement in place, the
paramilitaries can no longer have any reasonable or credible ob-
jections to decommissioning.
F. Security, Policing, and Justice
Security measures by the British and Irish Governments
28. Id., Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity, Human Rights, United
Kingdom Legislation 4.
29. See, e.g., Framework Convention, supra note 26.
30. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, Decommissioning, 3.
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could naturally be reduced in the context of a much diminished
terrorist threat. Similarly, draconian aspects to the criminal jus-
tice system carried no further justification. Once again, the Irish
Government's commitments in these respects are more vague
than those of the British Government.
Policing is a much more contentious issue. Many Unionists
perceive the Royal Ulster Constabulary ("RUC") to be "their" po-
lice force, while many Nationalists totally disassociate themselves
from it. Polarized positions from outright opposition to any re-
form to calls for total disbandment have' been adopted. Alliance
is content with the terms of reference of the Independent Com-
mission to recommend the way forward on policing."1 The RUC
played an invaluable role in upholding the rule of law over the
past thirty years; it is the base on which to build a new force.
There are reforms that in themselves are right, such as making
the police service more representative of Catholics and women;
changes of name and uniform are appropriate. Other likely re-
forms, such as a greater emphasis on community-policing, result
from the opportunities arising from a diminished terrorist
threat.
G. Prisoners
The proposed release of politically-motivated prisoners was
the most contentious aspect of the Agreement during the Refer-
endum campaign. Alliance never believed that paramilitary
members were "political prisoners," i.e., people in prison for
their opinions, but we did recognize that they were not ordinary
criminals. The unease that Alliance felt over, this section was re-
lated to the sensitivities of the victims rather than any great fear
of re-offending. Ultimately, this section of the Agreement was
necessary to obtain the support of the paramilitary-linked par-
ties.
H. Validation, Implementation, and Review
It was important to seek endorsement of the Agreement in
separate referendums in Northern Ireland and the Republic of
Ireland.12 The subsequent results of 71.1% and 94.4% 'Yes"
31. Id., Policing and Justice, Annex A.
32. Id., Validation, Implementation and Review, Validation and Implementation
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votes in the North and South, respectively, gave the Agreement a
substantial boost of cross-community-popular legitimacy.
There is also a commitment to a review of the terms and
workings of the Agreement after four years.33 Alliance looks for-
ward to this event. It will be an opportunity to improve parts of
the Agreement, especially some of the illiberal aspects and those
which are counter-productive to long-term stability in Northern
Ireland. Much of the wording of the Agreement was agreed dur-
ing a frantic forty-eight-hour period; it would be surprising that
with hindsight some of the terms could not be improved.
V. CONFLICT MANA GEMENT
The Agreement essentially outlines a conflict management
scenario. The Agreement is based on what is the dubious as-
sumption' of the rigid existence of "two communities." Both
Unionism and Nationalism are recognized as legitimate polit-
ical/ideological entities, each demanded and was granted a
veto3'4 and are in practice asked to manage the divided society of
Northern Ireland between them. The language of "two commu-
nities," even though it is based on dubious assumptions, is given
"respectability" through its formal usage in the Agreement. 35
For Alliance, conflict resolution-a post-conflict scenario-
would be characterized by the creation of liberal democracy.
Northern Ireland would be a genuinely pluralist place in which
societal divisions would be mainly cross-cutting, and no one divi-
sion would be overly more significant than any other. People
would be judged primarily as individuals rather as members of a
community to which they belong or are perceived to belong.
There would be a greater sense of common identity and collec-
tive consciousness. A new Northern Ireland would reflect the
U.S. motto of e pluribus unum.
However, in the Agreement by itself, there is no obvious
path to a post-conflict scenario; no conflict resolution strategy
exists. Nevertheless, it does not exclude such moves. Several al-
ternative futures can be built upon the foundation provided by
33. Id., Validation, Implementation and Review, Review procedures following im-
plementation 8.
34. Id., Strand One, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland, Safeguards
5(d).
35. E.g., id., Rights, Safeguards, and Equality of Opportunity, Human Rights,
United Kingdom Legislation 4.
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the Agreement. This includes the Alliance vision, but several ob-
stacles are thrown up to it.
A number of commentators have described the Agreement
as a "plural one." Behind all the rhetoric that comes from John
Hume and the SDLP, there is a profoundly illiberal vision of a
Northern Ireland built around not one but two rigidly differenti-
ated peoples, separate but equal. David Trimble has famously
described the new Assembly as a "Pluralist Parliament for a Plu-
ralist People." 6 This common Trimble-Hume vision is not one
of pluralism but one of tribal dualism. Pluralism means more
than two! This philosophical difference can be summed as the
difference between an Agreement between two peoples and an
Agreement among one people.
VI. CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE: LONG-
TERM THREATS TO THE AGREEMENT
Consociational democracy has had a mixed record of suc-
cess. An examination of the international experience can pro-
vide some lessons as to the conditions under which consocia-
tional democracy can work or fail. A key question for Alliance is
how consociational democracy can become sufficiently success-
ful in order to transform itself into what can be better described
as a liberal democracy.
The Netherlands and Switzerland are considered to be suc-
cessful case's of consociational democracy; Cyprus and Lebanon
are judged to have been unsuccessful. The jury is still out over
Belgium and Canada.
Consociationalism was not enough to prevent Bosnia de-
scending into conflict in 1992. Bosnia possessed a seven-mem-
ber collective Presidency, which deliberately included two Mus-
lims, two Bosnian Croats, two Bosnian Serbs, and one Yugoslav/
Other. Consociationalism resurfaced with the 1995 Dayton
Agreement. 7 This document recognizes three constituent peo-
36. First Minister David Trimble, Remarks at the Waterfront, preceding the key-
note address from President Clinton on his visit to Northern Ireland (Sept. 3, 1998).
This was a parody of the description of the then Irish Free State by Eamon de Valera, a
former Irish Taoiseach, as a "Catholic State for a Catholic People," and the response of
James Craig, Northern Ireland's first Prime Minister in which he described Stormont as
a "Protestant Parliament for a Protestant People."
37. Dayton Agreement on Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, Nov. 10, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 170.
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ples, forms a fresh collective Presidency, and creates a system of
complex checks and balances at the central level. Otherwise,
there is substantial autonomy granted to the different groups;
common institutions are rare. Bosnia remains dominated by the
politics of ethno-nationalism; there is little more than interna-
tional pressure and the international Stabilization Force (S-For)
to hold the country together. There is little strategy outlined in
the Dayton, Agreement for breaking down ethno-nationalism
and providing long-term stability.
In contrast, post-Apartheid South Africa is not characterized
by consociationalism. There are deep historical reasons against
making arbitrary distinctions among people on the basis of that
group to which they are perceived as belonging. Instead, there
is a heavy emphasis placed upon individual rights and building
common institutions. The short transitory power-sharing period
demonstrated that not all such arrangements need be consocia-
tional. A emphasis upon consensus rather than outright majori-
tarianism persists.
Consociational democracy has worked better within divided
societies based on linguistic, class, ideological, and religious divi-
sions, but rarely ethnic or ethno-nationalist divisions. This does
not bode well for Northern Ireland. The implication is not that
consociationalism is doomed here; rather it gives an impression
of the enormity of the struggle.
Consociationalism requires that there is a widespread con-
sensus on the nature and boundaries of the state and a common
sense of loyalty to a shared sense of destiny. Conflicting claims
of self-determination can be fatal to consociational democracy.
Despite the rigorous separation of Flemings and Walloons,
Belgium stays united because neither group wishes to secede to
join the Netherlands and France, respectively. In contrast, con-
sociationalism in Cyprus was a dramatic failure as the Greeks and
Turks could not reconcile their competing national identities.
In Canada, Francophone separatists are pushing for an in-
dependent Quebec.
Despite the now near-universal adherence to the Principle
of Consent, there is a long-term problem in that the Agreement
has been sold to Unionists as a means to safeguard the Union
with Great Britain and to Nationalists as part of a long-term strat-
egy to deliver a United Ireland. These mutually incompatible
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aspirations could eventually be exposed. It remains to be seen
whether the ring-fencing of Unionist and Nationalist aspirations
through the Principle of Consent, and loyalty to the Agreement,
will be sufficient to account for the lack of a common identity. It
is noteworthy that the United States is held together in large
measure through loyalty to its constitution and the rule of law.
In the likely event, that the above loci prove insufficient, there is
a fundamental requirement to build up a greater sense of collec-
tive consciousness-a regional identity-among the people of
Northern Ireland. Any new identity should be civic, cosmopoli-
tan, and multi-cultural. Alternatively, territorial aspirations
could become less significant as the efficacy of the nation-state,
and relevance of state sovereignty, breaks down both globally
and particularly in Ireland. Emphasis should accordingly be
placed on people rather territory.
Successful consociational democracy requires that the more
moderate leaders/parties representative of communal segments
are dominant over their more extreme versions. In Northern
Ireland, this requires the UUP and SDLP to be stronger than the
DUP and Sinn Fain, respectively. It is also helpful if centripetal
rather than centrifugal forces are at work. It is preferable that
the forces from the center place greater pressure on moderate
Unionism and Nationalism to cooperate than electoral pressure
from their respective extremes. If the more extreme forms of
either Unionism or Nationalism became bigger than their more
moderate rivals, then enormous pressure would be placed upon
the continued existence of consociational arrangements.
There is a further deficiency in that if the UUP and SDLP
underperform in their governmental duties, e.g., if they pursue
the wrong policies, are corrupt, or are generally incompetent,
outside of a realignment away from ethno-nationalist politics,
the electorate must either bite their tongues with respect to
these parties, defect towards center non-ethnic parties, or move
towards more extreme ethno-nationalist parties. There is a dan-
ger that anti-system parties on either side could be best placed to
exploit dissatisfaction, especially if they play on the fears of their
group that they are not achieving a sufficiently good deal out of
power-sharing arrangements.
This provides an obvious challenge therefore for center par-
ties such as Alliance to provide an effective and constructive op-
position to the UUP and SDLP and to position themselves to
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build up support from dissatisfied Unionists and Nationalists.
The danger of an extreme Unionist nor Nationalist party para-
lyzing the system by overhauling their more moderate equivalent
is exacerbated by the arcane voting procedures set out in the
Agreement; with weighted voting, the dangers would be much
lower.
It is better if the divisions within society are cross-cutting
rather than reinforcing, i.e., if religious, class, and ideological
differences intersect rather coincide with each other. Four or
five segments are judged to be optimal in consociational theory.
If the reality is that Northern Ireland is indeed divided into "two
communities," this will be fundamentally destabilizing to the
Agreement. If greater pluralism already exists or can be en-
couraged, then the Agreement has a better chance. In any case,
it is folly to institutionalize "two communities." It is better that
Northern Ireland is held together by a complex web of interac-
tions rather than dampening the collisions between two blocs. A
growth of pluralism would make consociational approaches less
necessary and would challenge the justification in labeling any
society consociational. In the Netherlands, and to a certain ex-
tent in Switzerland, increasing pluralism has overtaken the seg-
mentation of society, making consociational arrangements re-
dundant or much less relevant.
Consociationalism carries certain democratic limitations. It
places too much .emphasis on the interests and rights of groups
rather than individuals. The application of consociational de-
mocracy is often associated with the promotion of so-called
"group rights." Consociational democracy has the potential to
reinforce the divisions in a divided society by corporatizing the
different groups. This is not pleasant for those who do not asso-
ciate with any group. The main danger is that ethnic identities
and therefore divisions would be reinforced, leading to long-
term polarization. Divisions were well entrenched in Lebanon
and Cyprus. In Belgium, the different linguistic groups are not
only granted substantial autonomy, but are given their own sepa-
rate parliamentary chambers.
There is a further danger in a consociational democracy
when group political rights are institutionalized. The resulting
system may not be flexible enough to cope with demographic
changes. Placing minority groups on an equal political footing
to larger groups may infringe the larger groups' perceptions of
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democracy and further strain the system. For example, Lebanon
introduced a very inflexible consociational settlement in 1943.
As Muslim populations increased relative to the Christians, the
system became less sustainable. The government became too
timid to even take censuses lest the reality of the changing de-
mography became apparent. In the 1970s, the influx of Palestin-
ian refugees into Lebanon blew the system apart. In contrast,
consociational democracy was not a serious proposition in post-
Apartheid South Africa as the relatively low white population
would not make formal equality for that group democratically
sustainable.
In consociational democracy, there is often a lack of serious
opposition and a readily identifiable alternative government.
The same parties, and often individuals, tend to be present in
successive governments. Consequently, elections carry less sig-
nificance. Problems with accountability, conservatism and lack
of vision or imagination, and corruption can all be anticipated.
When the Belgian system struggled to cope with the infamous
Marc Detroux pedophile case, it created a public backlash.
There is a lack of research on how consociational democ-
racy distorts an economy. In a system where the interests of cor-
porate groups are addressed ahead of the interests of the popu-
lation as a whole, there is a danger of an over-duplication of serv-
ices needlessly draining scarce resources. Economic
inefficiencies could be tolerated, and specific interest groups re-
warded, in order to keep a certain political arrangement alive.
Again, it is surely no accident that Belgium has one of the high-
est public sector to GDP debt ratios within Western Europe. On
the other hand, the potential political stability that could be
granted to Northern Ireland from a durable Agreement should
provide a better framework for economic growth and inward in-
vestment.
Finally, liberal, cross-community, non- or multi-ethnic par-
ties, in general, do not prosper within consociational arrange-
ments as opposed to within more general power-sharing ar-
rangements. The Christian Democrat, Liberal, and Socialist par-
ties in Belgium are now all split along linguistic lines. The
Socialists were the last to give in after formal linguistic consocia-
tional measures were introduced in the early 1970s. Consocia-
tionalism is premised on and biased towards parties representing
particular segments of the population. However, the presence
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and relative strength of cross-community parties is an important
indicator of multi-ethnicity. Ultimately, it is hoped that a re-
alignment away from ethno-nationalist politics towards issue-
based politics can occur in Northern Ireland. The difficulties of
achieving this, however, should not be underestimated. For ex-
ample, although elections in the Republic of Ireland are now
issue based, the two main political parties-Fianna Fail and Fine
Gael-are differentiated on the basis of different sides in the
Irish Civil War, 1922-23.
VII. SHORT-TERM THREATS TO THE AGREEMENT
There is not yet public confidence in either the stability or
durability of the Agreement. There are widespread fears that
minor disputes or problems on ordinary governmental issues
could quickly escalate into full-blown crises.
The determination of the number and remit of Executive
Departments and the identification of North-South implementa-
tion bodies took an excessive time to achieve after the establish-
ment of the Assembly. Progress on decommissioning has re-
mained elusive. However, the actual formation of the Executive
has been most problematic. Although the Agreement does not
make decommissioning of paramilitary weapons a condition for
participation in the Executive, David Trimble and his Ulster
Unionists have foolishly drawn a line in the sand and refused to
participate in any Executive including Sinn Fin without a credi-
ble start to decommissioning. If Trimble moves forward, then
he risks splitting his party. As the formation of the Executive
needs to be ratified by the Assembly under a cross-community
vote, Trimble needs to carry at least three-quarters of his Assem-
bly representatives to pass the minimum threshold. Continued
stalling will delay the formal transfer of powers to Northern Ire-
land from the British Government and risks paralyzing the As-
sembly.
The composition of the first Executive-apart from the First
and Deputy First Ministers, which are determined separately by
the Assembly-will not be quite representative of Northern Ire-
land society. The application of the d'Hondt system will pro-
duce a 50:50 split between Unionism and Nationalism rather
than reflecting the communal ratio of 5:4:1 between Unionists,
Nationalists, and Others. A fractured center ground means that
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what would have otherwise been an Alliance seat fell by default
to the SDLP.
In contrast to voluntary associations of individual political
parties, the involuntary mechanisms of consociationalism are a
recipe for weak government. There will inevitably be unwilling
parties forced together and difficulties in reaching consensus.
The presumption must be that the DUP and Sinn Fain will ini-
tially take on their Departmental responsibilities The former
could refuse to cooperate or to sit formally with the Executive as
long as Sinn F~in are present. Sinn Fain could continue to hold
their seats while the IRA presides over low to medium intensity
violence. In the absence of either leaving voluntarily, it would
take a vote of the Assembly to expel them, requiring either the
UUP or SDLP to stand up bravely against their respective ex-
tremists. Weak and uncoordinated government can be ex-
pected.
Finally, tensions are also inevitable from the marriage of
democratically based parties with paramilitary-linked parties.
The latter have earned their right to be actors in the political
process through their democratic mandates. It is not sustainable
to democracy or the rule of law for political parties to be simulta-
neously involved in government and linked to "private armies."
Although there are measures to ensure that any individual who
is involved with or threatens violence can be expelled from of-
fice (but it is likely to be difficult to achieve in practice as it re-
quires a cross-community vote in the Assembly), there are no
explicit measures to require the disbandment of paramilitaries
or a cessation of the beatings through which these organizations
continue to exercise defacto control in certain parts of Northern
Ireland.
The politics of the first Assembly could be' dominated by the
difficulties within the Ulster Unionists. Due to the rigidities of
the voting system set out in the Agreement, at least twenty-four
of the fifty-eight Unionists of varying descriptions are required to
meet even the communal forty percent threshold under the
weighted majority system. Struggles within the Ulster Unionists
to compile the necessary votes may become all too frequent,
leading to weak government and turning every crucial vote into
one that threatens the durability of the Agreement.
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VIII. CONCLUSION: THE ALLIANCE AGENDA
The Agreement alone remains little more than a "Band-Aid"
approach to the Northern Ireland conflict. In essence, it sets
out a sufficient strategy for maintaining peace and political sta-
bility in the short term. Northern Ireland remains a deeply di-
vided and sectarian society. While Alliance accepts the Agree-
ment in full, we recognize that by itself it is not going either to
produce long-term peace and stability, or to create the type of
society that we wish to see. Yet, the Agreement provides a solid
foundation on which to start.
In the short term, Alliance is committed to making the
Agreement work, giving voice to the concerns of the "center
ground," and providing a radical and constructive opposition to
the policies pursued by the parties in the Executive. Our long-
term agenda comprises the measures required to go beyond the
"Band-Aid" approach, to move from "conflict management" to
"conflict resolution."
As ambitious as our agenda appears, it is vital that our soci-
ety tries to go as far as possible down this road. Appropriate
steps include the promotion sharing rather than separation
among the people of Northern Ireland, a playing down rather
than an institutionalization of sectarian differences, an apprecia-
tion that a proper pluralist society involves multi-strands within
one society rather than two communities based on separatism,
greater emphasis upon the individual than the group, the pro-
motion of a common cosmopolitan and multicultural civic iden-
tity for Northern Ireland, a down-grading of territorial aspira-
tions in favor of uniting people, and ultimately progression to-
wards a new type of politics that transcends sectarianism. With
an Agreement in place, our challenge is now to turn these neces-
sary measures into practical policies.
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